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Contracts :  an  American  Perspective  on  the  Principles  
and  Their  Use 
 
Henry Deeb Gabriel * 
 
I. – THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: WHAT THEY ARE 
AND WHERE THEY COME FROM  
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 1 are the 
product of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT). UNIDROIT was set up in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League 
of Nations. Following the demise of the League, the organization was re-
established in 1940 on the basis of a multilateral agreement. UNIDROIT is an 
independent intergovernmental organization. Its purpose is to examine ways 
of coordinating the private law of States and to prepare gradually for the 
adoption by States of uniform rules of private law. UNIDROIT’s member States 
are drawn from the five continents and represent a variety of different legal, 
economic, and political systems.2  
 
*  Professor of Law, Elon University (United States of America); member of the 2010 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Law drafting committee; member of the 
UNIDROIT Governing Council. 
 This article is based on the author’s contribution to the international Symposium on 
“The 2010 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Towards a ‘Global’ 
Contract Law”, hosted by the Center for Transnational Business and the Law at Georgetown 
University in Washington, D.C. on 28 October 2011. The data analysed in this article is as at 
22 July 2011.  
1  International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (1st ed. 1994) (hereinafter: the Principles), available in 34 
International Legal Materials (1995), 1067. 
2  UNIDROIT has 63 member States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, 
 
Henry Deeb Gabriel 
508 Unif. L. Rev. 2012 
The UNIDROIT Governing Council approved the project to draft the 
contract Principles in 1971, but a working group was not set up until 1980. 
The first set of Principles was approved in 1994. These are composed of a 
Preamble and 119 articles divided into seven chapters: “General Provisions” 
(Chapter 1); “Formation” (Chapter 2); “Validity” (Chapter 3); “Interpretation” 
(Chapter 4); “Content” (Chapter 5); “Performance” (Chapter 6); and “Non-
Performance” (Chapter 7). Chapter 6 has two sections dealing with 
“Performance in General” and “Hardship”, respectively, while Chapter 7 has 
four sections: one concerning “Non-Performance in General”, one on the 
“Right to Performance”, one on “Termination”, and one on “Damages”. 
The second set of Principles was promulgated in 2004.3 The 2004 
Principles do not replace the 1994 Principles but supplement them with new 
additional chapters on “Set-off” (Chapter 8); “Assignment of Rights, Transfer of 
Obligations, Assignment of Contracts” (Chapter 9); and “Limitation Periods” 
(Chapter 10); as well as a new Section 2 to Chapter 2 on the “Authority of 
Agents”.4 
 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 
Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of). 
3  In addition to the English and French versions of the 2004 Principles, promulgated 
by UNIDROIT, the Principles have also been translated into Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, German, 
Italian, Korean, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Spanish and Vietnamese. The 2010 Principles 
are available in English and French (integral version) and in German, Italian, Japanese, 
Portuguese, Russian and Spanish (black-letter rules).  
 For further general discussion on the Principles, see M.J. BONELL, Caselaw and 
Bibliography on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2d. ed., 2005); 
Idem, “Soft Law and Party Autonomy, the Case of the UNIDROIT Principles”, 51 Loyola Law 
Review (2005), 229; Idem, “From UNIDROIT Principles 1994 to UNIDROIT Principles 2004: A 
Further Step Towards a Global Contract Law”, 37 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 
(2004), 1; “Symposium, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Law: Why? What? 
How?”, 69 Tulane Law Review (1995), 1121.  
 For a comparison of the Principles with the European Principles of Contract Law, see 
M.J. BONELL, “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Law and the Principles of 
European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purpose?”, 2 Unif. L. Rev. / Rev. dr. unif. 
(1996), 229; O. LANDO, “A Vision of the Future World Contract Law: Impact of European and 
UNIDROIT Contract Principles”, 37 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal (2004), 2.  
4  The only substantive change made in the 2004 version from the original 1994 text is 
an amendment to Art. 2.8(2) on the effect of holidays occurring during or at the expiration of 
the period of time fixed by an offeror for acceptance. This section is now in Art. 1.12.  
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A third set of Principles was completed in 2010. The 2010 edition adds 
new sections on illegality, conditions, restitution in failed contracts, and 
plurality of obligors and obligees, and amends some of the sections in the 
general provisions, the grounds for avoidance, and termination. In addition, 
some reordering of the Principles has been done. 
The Principles are intended to enunciate rules that are common to most 
legal systems.5 To the extent that the rules do not reflect these principles, they 
are designed to accommodate the special requirements of international trade.6 
The “black-letter rules” are accompanied by extensive and detailed comments, 
including illustrations, which form an integral part of the Principles. 
Important from an American legal perspective, unlike an international 
treaty or convention, or a domestic statute, which are sources of 
international and domestic positive law, the UNIDROIT Principles do not 
apply by legislative mandate. Instead, they were drafted as a non-legislative 
standard of uniformity for international commercial contracts. In this limited 
respect, they are similar to the Restatements of Law promulgated by the 
American Law Institute in the United States.7 As such, the Principles do not 
have the force of law 8 and, therefore, must be incorporated into a contract 
 
5  M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law (3d. ed., 2005), at 46. The 
primary influences were codifications that had recently been drafted or amended. These include 
domestic legislation, such as the American Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement 2d of 
Contracts, the Algerian Civil Code, the Dutch Civil Code, the Civil Code of Quebec, and the law 
of obligations of the German Civil Code. The CISG also was a major influence. Ibidem, 48-49. 
6  Ibidem, 46–47 and 50–52.  
7  In fact, the American Restatement of Law was the model for the UNIDROIT Principles. 
See M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law (2d ed., 1997), 19; BONELL, 
supra note 5, at 9–25.  
 It would be misleading to overstate the similarities between the American 
Restatements of Law and the UNIDROIT Principles. Certainly they are both attempts to 
systematize a specific body of law. Moreover, they are constructed in the same way in that they 
both provide black-letter rules followed by extensive explanations and examples. However, the 
American Restatements have been drafted within the framework of existing American law. For 
the most part, the Restatements provide a ready source of what the existing law is. The 
UNIDROIT Principles, on the other hand, were drafted independently of any domestic law and 
therefore, unlike the Restatements, do not provide a source of what the law is, but what the law 
should be. This aspiration aspect of the UNIDROIT Principles negates any real argument that they 
are a Restatement in the American sense. 
8  Because the Principles do not have the force of law, it may be asked what purpose 
the Principles are meant to serve. There is not a single goal, but in fact a multitude of 
considerations that support the Principles. For a discussion of the goals of the Principles, see 
BONELL, supra note 5, at 9–25. For the view that since the Principles have no legislative impact, 
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or used by a judge or arbitrator.9 
The Principles have also to be placed within the broad family of non-
binding legal rules that are often referred to as “soft law”.10 Various soft law 
instruments are well known and widely used by American parties in 
international commercial transactions. These include model laws,11 
codifications of customs and usages,12 and the promulgation of international 
trade terms.13 What these have in common is that they fill in a specific 
transactional need. As will be discussed below, the question is whether the 
 
they should be treated as primarily a grand academic enterprise: see C. KESSEDJIAN, “Un exercice 
de renovation des sources du droit des contrats du commerce international: les Principes 
proposés par l’UNIDROIT”, Revue critique de droit international privé (1995), 641. 
9  “This means, in essence, that the UNIDROIT Principles will be applied only if 
incorporated into a contract, or if the Principles find enough favor with an arbitrator or a judge 
looking for a rule to fill a gap encountered in the regulation of a given international commercial 
contract.” “Symposium, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts – The 
Gap Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales Law: Some Comments on the 
Interplay Between the Principles and the CISG”, 69 Tulane Law Review (1995), 1149. See also 
K.P. BERGER, “International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts”, 46 American Journal of Comparative Law (1998), 129 (reviewing the 
circumstances under which international arbitral tribunals have applied the UNIDROIT 
Principles); Idem, “The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts”, 28 Law & Policy in International Business (1997), 943 (discussing the 
doctrinal and practical issues related to the lex mercatoria doctrine as it applies to the UNIDROIT 
Principles); O. LANDO, “Assessing the Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in the Harmonization of 
Arbitration Law”, 3 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law (1995), 129 (discussing 
the concept of lex mercatoria as it applies to the UNIDROIT Principles); A.M. GARRO, “The 
Contribution of the UNIDROIT Principles to the Advancement of International Commercial 
Arbitration”, 3 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law (1995), 93 (providing an 
overview of the circumstances under which the UNIDROIT principles are and should be applied 
in an arbitration setting). 
10  Defined by one commentator, “‘soft law’ is understood as referring in general to 
instruments of normative nature with no legally binding force and which are applied only 
through voluntary acceptance”: M.J. BONELL, “Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the 
UNIDROIT Principles”, 51 Loyola Law Review (2005), 229. Soft law is generally established legal 
rules that are not positive and therefore not judicially binding. 
11  See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985).  
12  For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has promulgated the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits which set out the rules and principles 
that govern letters of credit. The ICC, which was founded in 1919 in Paris, is a federation of 
business organizations and business people. It is a non-governmental body, and it is neither 
supervised nor subsidized by governments. 
13  See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2010. 
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Principles likewise fill a specific need for American parties to international 
commercial transactions. 
II. – THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
Eighteen years after their original promulgation, there are only two 14 reported 
American cases that address the Principles.15 The court in neither case 
addressed any substantive aspect of the Principles.  
In The Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc.,16 the court was asked 
to affirm and enforce an arbitral award under the 1958 Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention). The court in this case addressed the narrow issue of whether the 
use of the Principles as a source of international commercial law by an ICC 
arbitral tribunal exceeded the scope of the tribunal’s terms of reference. 
Noting that one of the questions presented to the tribunal was whether 
international law applied to the dispute, the court found the tribunal’s 
reference to the Principles was clearly within the tribunal’s terms of reference. 
As the provisions of the Principles themselves were not at issue in the case, 
the court neither used nor analyzed any specific provision of the Principles 
nor in any way noted how the Principles operate within the framework of 
American domestic law.  
 
14  A third case is mistakenly listed in the UNILEX database: Koda v. Carnival Corp., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97109 (order to compel arbitration); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100084 (order 
denying motion for rehearing). In this case, the court does not reference the Principles. The 
plaintiff cites the Principles in its pleadings, and this citation is picked up by the UNILEX 
database as being part of the court opinion.  
15  A third case is mistakenly listed in the UNILEX database: Koda v. Carnival Corp., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97109 (order to compel arbitration); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100084 (order 
denying motion for rehearing). In this case, the court does not reference the Principles. The 
plaintiff cites the Principles in its pleadings, and this citation is picked up by the UNILEX 
database as being part of the court opinion.I do not want to suggest that this is an abnormally 
low number of cases for any country. There are only 94 reported cases worldwide, 
<http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1>, and only two 
countries, Spain and Australia, have more than ten reported cases. There are no reported 
German cases in the UNILEX database that apply the Principles. 
16  United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 29 Federal 
Supplement 1168 (1998). 
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In a second American case, the court was asked to compel arbitration 
under the New York Convention.17 In this case, the arbitration was 
challenged on the grounds that the arbitration agreement was both uncon-
scionable under domestic American law as well as a violation of the doctrine 
of fairness under the Principles because the party had no real bargaining 
power for the terms of the contract. Noting that the court was bound by the 
precedent that lack of bargaining power was not a defense to an arbitration 
agreement,18 the court determined that neither domestic law nor the 
Principles were a basis for overriding the existing law. The court in this case 
neither discussed the difference between the standard of fairness under the 
Principles and the concomitant rule under American domestic law nor did the 
court state what would suffice under the requirement of fairness under the 
Principles to invalidate an arbitration clause or any other contract provision. 
There is one American administrative determination by the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation, which dealt with a dispute between an 
American and Argentinean parties that recognized the Principles for the 
purpose of determining contract formation.19 The administrative tribunal 
made the unremarkable finding that the Principles provide for contract 
formation both by an offer as well as by conduct. It is not clear whether the 
parties provided for the application of the Principles in their agreement or 
whether the tribunal raised it on its own. 
As for arbitrations, the extent to which American parties have chosen or 
consented to the Principles as controlling law, or the extent to which tribunals 
have applied the Principles in transactions with American parties cannot be 
ascertained because the majority of the awards are unreported. There are, 
however, no reported American arbitrations that use the Principles. 
III. – HOW AND WHY AMERICAN COURTS MIGHT USE THE PRINCIPLES 
There is much to commend the Principles to American courts. To the extent that 
a court is not otherwise constrained by conflict of laws rules, other mandatory 
rules, or public policy restraints, the Principles have specific characteristics that 
suggest their use in appropriate cases. First, the Principles are designed for 
 
17  Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, 706 Federal Supplement 1271 (United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida, 2010). 
18  The court cited Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 Federal Reporter 3d 12 89 (United States 
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, 2005). 
19  <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1125>. 
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international contracts, and they reflect the expectations of international 
commerce more than most domestic laws.20 In addition, to the extent that a 
transaction may be governed by other international law, such as the CISG, the 
broad scope of the Principles may be a useful supplement to interpret the 
otherwise applicable law.  
It is difficult to determine how often the Principles are used, either in 
American or other agreements because in the majority of cases where the 
parties have chosen to use the Principles, no dispute arises. Actual usage is, 
therefore, unknown. Moreover, in the majority of agreements in which they 
are used the Principles sit in the background without being interpreted. In 
addition, even when there is a dispute between parties that may implicate the 
Principles, the majority of cases in which they have been used, either by party 
choice or by the decision of a court or arbitral tribunal, will not be reported. 
Given these constraints of information, it is still possible to examine the 
reported cases in which the parties have used the Principles. There are 
actually quite few – only 255 reported court cases and arbitral awards since 
the Principles were first promulgated.21 This would suggest that parties are not 
widely adopting the Principles and courts and arbitral tribunals are not widely 
using them as controlling.  
Yet, in appropriate circumstances,22 the Principles might be a source of 
guidance to courts. The American Restatements of Law, which as mentioned 
above are soft law instruments similar to the Principles,23 have been widely 
used by American courts as a basis for forging new legal rules as well as inter-
 
20  The American Uniform Commercial Code, for example, is primarily based on 
American domestic case law, and it reflects a particular American, if not common law legal 
perspective.  
21  This figure was taken from the Rome-based UNILEX database, and tracks all reported 
cases (<http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13618&x=1> (last viewed 
on July 22, 2011)). 
22  Presumably the use of the Principles would be limited to commercial, and probably 
international, disputes. 
23  For a discussion of the similarities between the Principles and the American 
Restatements, see M.J. BONELL, “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts and CISG: 
Alternative or Complementary Instrument?”, Unif. L. Rev. / Rev. dr. unif. (1996), 26-39. 
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preting existing ones.24 For international commercial contracts, the Principles 
could possibly, in a limited role 25 as discussed below, fill this need.  
For example, the Principles could be used as gap fillers when the 
otherwise applicable international or domestic law does not address a specific 
question. Thus, as the Principles have a broader scope than the 1980 United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),26 
they have been used to resolve questions not addressed by the CISG.27 
As for questions that might otherwise be resolved by American domestic 
law, although the scope of the Principles does not cover any area where there 
is no otherwise applicable domestic law, given that the Principles only govern 
international contracts, a court may well decide that the proper rule, if the 
domestic law otherwise deviated from the Principles, should be the Principles 
because the expectations of parties in an international transaction differ from 
the expectations of parties in a domestic transaction, these latter expectations 
being reflected in the otherwise applicable domestic law.  
If we look at the possible uses of the Principles as suggested by the 
Preamble to the Principles, it is fair to conclude that the impact on an 
American court 28 would be quite limited. The Preamble to the Principles 
suggests six specific uses: 
1. They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be 
governed by them.  
2. They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be 
governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like.  
 
24  See K.D. ADAMS, “The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of 
Justice?”, 32 Southern Illinois University Law Journal (2007), 173. 
25  It would be misleading to overstate the similarities between the American 
Restatements of Law and the UNIDROIT Principles. The American Restatements have been 
drafted based on existing American law. When an American court cites the Restatements, it is 
generally either to fill in a gap of that state’s law or to permissibly extend the existing law of that 
state. For an American court to apply the Principles, except in the limited circumstance where 
the Principles were being used to interpret the existing law, the Principles would be used to 
supplant the existing law. This is a fundamentally more radical use of the Principles than would 
be the use by a court of the Restatements.  
26  The major areas of scope in the Principles that are not covered by the CISG are 
limitation periods, assignment of rights and delegation of duties, third party rights, and set-off. 
27  See, e.g., Hideo Yoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Limited, Court of Appeal 
of New Zealand, (2000) NZCA 350; SCEA GAEC Des Beauches Bernard Bruno v. Société Teso 
Ten Elsen GmbH & COKG, Cour d’appel de Grenoble (1996). 
28  These limitations may not apply to an arbitral tribunal.  
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3. They may be applied when the parties have not chosen any law to 
govern their contract.  
4. They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law 
instruments.  
5. They may be used to interpret or supplement domestic law.  
6. They may serve as a model for national and international legislators.  
It is the first five of these that might have some application in a court 
deciding an international commercial law case.29 
Before looking at any of these particular uses, it is important to remember 
that the Principles were drafted with the goal of providing guidance for 
international commercial contracts. Embedded in this is the notion, that 
presumably would be recognized by American courts, that parties to both 
domestic and non-commercial contracts have different expectations from 
those that arise in international commercial contracts. Thus, to the extent that 
an agreement is either a domestic or consumer contract, the Principles would 
probably not be the best model, as both domestic and consumer contracts 
would normally entail expectations and assumed risks different from 
international commercial contracts.30 Moreover, it is unlikely that any 
American court would have any basis for looking outside domestic American 
law in a non-international or a non-commercial contractual agreement.  
As for the utility of the Principles as a basis for the governance of 
international commercial contracts, it is important to distinguish between 
those contracts in which the parties have chosen the Principles to govern the 
agreement and those contracts in which a court or arbitral tribunal indepen-
dently decides to apply the Principles. In those cases in which the court or 
tribunal is independently choosing to use the Principles, it is also important to 
 
29  The question of whether the Principles may be the source of future American 
legislation is discussed below. Legislative law revision, though, is not a concern of the courts. 
30  Explaining why the Principles might be used as guidance for the interpretation of 
domestic law, the comments that accompany the Preamble to the Principles state “[e]specially 
where the dispute relates to an international commercial contract, it may be advisable to resort 
to the Principles as a source of inspiration.” (UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, Preamble, Comment 6) This comment suggests the limited scope but important 
possible application of the Principles: those cases in which a domestic law is the governing law, 
but the contract itself is an international contract. The cited cases and arbitral decisions on this 
point have been limited to the circumstances where the Principles have been cited either to 
interpret how the domestic law should apply in an international case or to supplement the findings 
in the case by the customs and usages of international practice derived from the Principles. 
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distinguish between the use of the substantive rules of the Principles as 
controlling and the use of the Principles to interpret other law. 
(a) The parties expressly choose the Principles 
If the parties expressly choose the application of the Principles, the role of the 
courts should be straightforward. Subject to any restriction the jurisdiction’s 
law may have on choice of law,31 the court should simply apply the 
Principles.32 At least in the reported cases, the American courts have not had 
the opportunity to apply the Principles by party choice.  
It should be noted that the question of choice of law under American law 
may be more restrictive than under other systems. For example, under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the parties’ choice of law is limited to those 
agreements where the chosen law bears a reasonable relation to the chosen 
jurisdiction.33  
Moreover, there is the question of whether the parties’ choice of the 
Principles would be recognized under choice of law principles at all as the 
Principles are not recognized “law” in the normal sense of the term. In the 
case of specific party choice to use the Principles, though, in a properly 
drafted agreement the choice of law restrictions should not prevent the 
application of the Principles if the agreement specifies that the Principles are 
not binding as a choice of law, but instead, are binding as the explicit terms of 
the agreement itself.34 This is simply the application of the Principles as 
freedom of contract and not as choice of law.  
 
31  PICC, Preamble, Comment 4. 
32  This is, of course, subject to any mandatory rules that the governing jurisdiction may 
have that would overrule or supplement the Principles. This point is recognized in the 
Principles: “Nothing in these Principles shall restrict the application of mandatory rules, 
whether of national, international or supranational origin, which are applicable in accordance 
with the relevant rules of private international law.” (PICC Art. 1.4) 
33  Uniform Commercial Code § 1-301(b). A proposed revision to the Uniform 
Commercial Code would have limited this choice of law restriction to domestic cases, thereby 
allowing international commercial parties a more unrestricted limitation on choice of law. This 
revision, however, has only been adopted by the United States Virgin Islands, and the Official 
Version of the Uniform Commercial Code withdrew this proposal in 2008. 
34  This is recognized in the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code:  
 An agreement that varies the effect of provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
may do so by stating the rules that will govern in lieu of the provisions varied. Alternatively, the 
parties may vary the effect of such provisions by stating that their relationships will be governed 
by recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable to commercial transactions. Such bodies 
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(b) The parties choose the contract to be governed by general principles of 
law or lex mercatoria 
In the rare case where the parties expressly provide for the application of 
“general principles of international law” or some equivalent, it is possible, but 
unlikely, that an American court would determine that the Principles should 
apply. At this time, no reported court case, American or otherwise, has done 
so, although several arbitration cases have.35 The problem with the 
application of the Principles in this circumstance is the unlikelihood that a 
court would recognize the Principles as positive law.36 As there is already 
positive international commercial law, such as the CISG, a court would likely 
gravitate toward such existing positive law.  
(c) The Principles used to interpret other applicable law 
As a basis for interpreting other governing law, the Principles might be used 
either to interpret how the governing international law might be interpreted 37 
or to supplement the findings in the case by a custom and usage of 
international practice as derived from the Principles.38 As noted, no American 
case has used the Principles for this purpose, but as the Principles become 
more widely known, this is one use of the Principles that could develop in 
American law.  
 
of rules or principles may include, for example, those that are promulgated by inter-
governmental authorities such as UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT (see, e.g., UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts), or non-legal codes such as trade codes. (Uniform 
Commercial Code § 1-302 Official Comment 2) 
35  This is noted in the Rome-based UNILEX database: <http://www.unilex.info/ 
dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13621&x=1>. 
36  As discussed above, this is fundamentally different from the circumstance where the 
parties’ agreement is governed by other application law, and the parties choose the Principles 
as the terms of the agreement, and under the principle of freedom of contract, the otherwise 
applicable law is supplanted by the Principles. 
37  This use appears to be more theoretical than practical: there are only two reported 
cases of the Principles being used for this purpose. This would be expected, particularly when 
the CISG is the governing law, as there are already hundreds of cases interpreting every 
provision of the CISG as well as hundreds of articles and books exploring every nook and 
cranny of the CISG. The need for yet another interpretive view is not present. 
38  There is no reported court decision having done this; however, there are fifteen 
arbitration decisions that have used the Principles as a basis to determine international customs 
and trade usage. 
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(d) The Principles used where there is no express choice of law clause or 
incorporation of the principles into the terms of the agreement 
The Preamble to the Principles suggests that the Principles may be applied in 
cases where there is not an express choice of law by the parties. This appears 
to be more aspirational than realistic. No court, much less an American court, 
has done so.39 Given the hurdles a court would normally follow to find the 
Principles as the governing law, this is understandable. Under conflict of law 
rules (rules of private international law), a court would normally look to the 
governing law of one of the jurisdictions of one of the parties or to an 
applicable international convention or treaty. The Principles, not having been 
adopted as the positive law of any jurisdiction, would not be applicable under 
these rules. The comments to the Preamble mention the inherent flexibility of 
arbitral rules to provide an arbitral tribunal with the power to choose the 
applicable law.40 This flexibility is not generally recognized by courts. 
IV. – HOW AND WHY AMERICAN PARTIES MIGHT USE THE PRINCIPLES 
There is no evidence of any extensive use of the Principles by American 
contracting parties. There appear to be two possible reasons for this, but no 
empirical evidence to support either or both reasons. First, parties may just be 
unaware of the Principles. Second, parties may have some familiarity with the 
Principles but have not determined that the Principles create any substantial 
benefits over what would otherwise be the applicable law. It is this second 
reason that goes to the core issue of whether the Principles are likely to have 
any substantial future among American parties.  
Within the limits provided by choice of law rules and party autonomy, it 
is assumed that parties may choose to adopt specific rules embodied in non-
binding instruments such as the Principles.41 Parties may choose the Prin-
ciples because they believe the rules reflect their business relationship better 
than domestic or other international law or they seek a neutral principle that 
 
39  There are three reported arbitration cases in which the tribunal, acting as amiable 
compositeur, chose the Principles as the governing law. 
40  PICC Preamble, Comment 4(c). 
41  Some instruments, such as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits or the INCOTERMS, are so commonly used and accepted that they often govern by 
default absent a contrary party agreement. Most soft law instruments, however, become a part 
of the parties’ agreement by express or implicit adoption. 
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does not give one party an advantage.42 This is unusual, though, and not 
common among American parties.  
In fact, to a large extent, the question is not what the best law is, but what 
the governing law is. For if the parties know what the operative law is, they 
know what rules they need to draft around. Given the general allowance of 
freedom of contract, this is generally allowed except to the extent that the 
provisions violate otherwise mandatory law. As mandatory provisions are the 
major limitation on the use of the Principles,43 parties have virtually equal 
freedom to draft their agreements as they wish, whether or not they use the 
Principles as the underlying law.  
Despite these limitations, there may be some advantages to using the 
Principles that American parties should consider. First, the Principles were 
drafted specifically to provide rules that broadly accommodate both the Civil 
and Common law traditions. To the extent that the parties are uncomfortable 
with an agreement that is governed by either of these legal traditions, the 
Principles provide some neutrality. 
Moreover, although there has not been any American case interpreting 
the Principles, there are cases from other jurisdictions that have, and these 
cases, in addition to the extensive comments that accompany the Principles, 
provide clear interpretive guidance. This should, to some extent, alleviate the 
concern parties will have as to how the Principles will be understood.  
 
42  Between parties of unequal bargaining power, it is not uncommon for the stronger 
party to insist on the choice of its own domestic law. However, there are times when a party, 
although having sufficient bargaining power to impose its own domestic law, in practice prefers 
not to because of its own law’s lack of predictability or for another reason, and instead opts for 
other governing law such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
 For instance, as pointed out by the President of the International Court of Arbitration 
of the Russian Federation, “[a] reason which may militate in favour of the wide use of the 
UNIDROIT Principles [in Russia] is the fact that Russian lawyers and business people do not seem 
to be as reluctant as their foreign counterparts to contemplate references to the Principles in 
place of the application of their domestic law on the ground that the former would not confer 
on them the advantages which parties to foreign trade contracts usually expect from the 
application of their own domestic law, namely the well-known and detailed regulation of 
business transactions to which they are accustomed”: A.S. KOMAROV, “The UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts: A Russian View”, Unif. L. Rev. / Rev. dr. unif. (1996), 
247, 250). 
 Because parties are free to negotiate the performance terms of their agreement, it is 
not clear that the Principles are likely to provide any party advantage in most circumstances. 
The standards under the otherwise applicable law that the parties do not want to govern can 
simply be contracted away. 
43  PICC Art. 1.4. 
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V. – THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AS AN INSPIRATION FOR FUTURE AMERICAN LAW 
In the recent attempts to revise the American Uniform Commercial Code, the 
drafting committee was mandated to look at international legal rules, 
particularly the CISG, for possible guidance. The revisions, completed in 2003, 
and recently withdrawn without enactment, did not in fact draw upon any 
section of the CISG for guidance.44 Likewise, the Principles, which could have 
been a source of inspiration, did not have any influence whatsoever on the 
revisions. As it is unlikely that commercial law in the United States, at least at 
a national level,45 will be revised in the near future, there is little possibility 
that the Principles will have any influence on the statutory commercial law in 
the United States any time soon. 
Given the experience with the revisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, though, it is unlikely that the Principles would have any influence on 
domestic American law even if it were being revised today. Ideally, a revision 
of commercial law would look at other legal systems and sets of rules, such as 
the Principles, for solutions to existing problems as well as for improvements 
over existing law. In the revision process in the United States, we found 
structural challenges that impeded this.  
First, there was the question of the mandate. The primary goal was to 
resolve existing problems, and to the extent practical, harmonize the domestic 
commercial law with international law. But because the Principles are not 
binding positive law, in their efforts to harmonize, and all the complications 
that this entailed, the drafters did not focus on soft law such as the Principles 
because the soft law did not create a conflict between two sets of binding 
 
44  Thus, after twelve years of work revising the American Uniform Commercial Code, 
the fruits of attempting to harmonize the Uniform Commercial Code with the CISG were 
reduced to the following prefatory comment: “When the parties enter into an agreement for the 
international sale of goods, because the United States is a party to the Convention, the 
applicable law may be the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG). Since many of the provisions of the CISG appear quite similar to provisions in 
Article 2, early in the process of drafting the amendments the drafting committee considered 
making references in the Official Comments to similar provisions in the CISG. However, upon 
reflection, the drafting committee concluded that these references should not be included 
because their inclusion might suggest a greater similarity between the Article 2 and the CISG 
than in fact exists.” 
45  Commercial law in the United States is for the most part state and not federal law. 
But because of the Uniform Commercial Code, many of the commercial laws are drafted for 
adoption by the several states with the idea that there will be national uniformity.  
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positive law, and therefore there was nothing seen in the Principles to 
harmonize with the domestic law.  
Moreover, when the drafters confronted the actual and perceived 
problems of the existing law, the focus tended to be inward-looking; the focus 
was on correcting perceived existing deficiencies as opposed to looking 
outward toward other sources of law such as the Principles. It is also the case 
that many who were tasked with the revisions brought to the process expertise 
in the laws being revised, but most had no particular expertise with other laws 
such as the Principles.  
A second problem the drafters confronted in the revision of American 
commercial law with consideration of international norms, such as the 
Principles, was the accommodation of different legal traditions.46 The 
updating of commercial law should, ideally, take into account the 
globalization of trade and economies, and this should entail looking at a 
variety of other commercial legal regimes. However, to the extent that this 
crosses different legal traditions, revision efforts that attempt to bridge these 
legal traditions have been quite difficult. To the extent that the Principles 
embody Civil law concepts, this would create difficulty in their use as a 
source for American law in the future.47 
It is yet to be seen what influence the Principles may have on other 
domestic legislation in the future. It may well be that they are used as a model 
because they are well drafted and balanced,48 or this may occur simply 
because they are a convenient and ready source of law and therefore 
 
46  Primarily, this arises in the context of trying to adjust rules that accommodate both 
the Common law and the Civil law traditions. 
47  For a general discussion of the incompatibility issues in an attempt to reconcile the 
American domestic law and the CISG, see H.D. GABRIEL, “The Inapplicability of the United 
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods as a Model for the revision of Article 
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code”, 72 Tulane Law Review (1998), 1995. 
 Although there have been many successful efforts to harmonize international 
commercial law, this success has largely been due to the fact that its principles have only to be 
compatible with international commercial practice, not with domestic laws based on Civil law 
or Common law traditions. An obvious exception is the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The CISG successfully straddles both the 
Common law and the Civil Law, and avoids grappling with the major distinctions between the 
two. See H.D. GABRIEL, Contracts for the Sale of Goods: A Comparison of U.S. and International 
law, Oxford University Press (2009), at 14. 
48  This would appear to be the case with the recent promulgation by the Organization 
for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa of a new Uniform Law on Contracts, which is 
based on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
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eliminate the difficulty of drafting new language.49 Regardless, they have not 
nor are likely to have much influence on the development of American law.  
VI. – COMPARISON OF THE MAJOR RULES OF THE PRINCIPLES WITH AMERICAN 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW 
If American contracting parties choose to adopt the Principles as governing in 
their agreements in the future, they will discover, for the most part, that the 
Principles are consistent with American law and will cause little conflict. 
Moreover, except to the extent that the Principles derogate from mandatory 
domestic law,50 the Principles will govern over otherwise applicable domestic 
law that would apply if the parties had not chosen the Principles. There are, 
however, some areas where the Principles vary from American commercial 
contract law, and in this section, I highlight the main issues.  
American commercial contract law is a blend of statutory and case law. 
Moreover, because commercial law is for the most part state, and not federal 
law, there are fifty separate state (and several district and territory) laws that 
govern commercial transactions.51 Thus, to speak of an American law of 
commercial contracts is somewhat misleading. However, as most of American 
commercial law 52 is based on general common law principles, and the 
various jurisdictions have long looked to the law of their sister American 
jurisdiction in the development of contract law, it can be accurately said that 
there are general principles of American commercial contracts. These general 
contract rules can be compared to the Principles.  
 
49  Describing the influence of the American Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Restatement Second of Contracts on the drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Contracts, the late Professor Allan Farnsworth noted: unlike any other common lawyer, “I came 
with texts in statutory form: the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. No decision of a common law tribunal – not even the House of Lords -- was as 
persuasive as a bit of blackletter text”: E.A. FARNSWORTH, “The American Provenance of the 
UNIDROIT Principles”, 72 Tulane Law Review (1998), 1985, 1990. 
50  Subject, of course, to otherwise applicable mandatory law. See PICC Art. 1.4. 
51  With the Uniform Commercial Code articles on contracts for the sale of goods 
enacted in all states except Louisiana, at least for these limited types of contracts (contracts for 
the sale of goods) it is possible to discuss American commercial contracts.  
52  With the exception of Louisiana, which is a Civil law jurisdiction.  
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(a) Structural differences and major concepts  
American commercial contract law operates within a context of established 
principles of the Common law of contracts. Conversely, the Principles are not 
based on any particular set of underlying established domestic legal 
principles. Instead, they were drafted to be independent of, rather than to 
work in conjunction with, any particular domestic law or legal tradition.53 
Thus, any comparative discussion must recognize the lack of a common legal 
tradition. This is not just an academic concern of comparative legal scholars, 
but also a concern of practicing lawyers who would have to navigate in 
unfamiliar territory if the Principles were used. 
The Principles also lack two traditional staples of the common law: the 
statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule.54 The absence of a statute of 
frauds (certain contracts need to be in writing to be enforceable) is only a 
theoretical difference – most international contracts will have a writing or 
electronic equivalent, and moreover the writing requirement might be 
enforceable anyway under the Principles as a mandatory rule.55  
The lack of a parol evidence rule may also be more of a theoretical 
distinction. This goes to the general question of contract interpretation. The 
Principles set out a general standard of interpretation of statements and other 
conduct that is derived from Article 8 of the Convention: 
1. The statements and other conduct of a party shall be interpreted 
according to that party’s intention if the other party knew or could not 
have been unaware of that intention. 
 
53  See F. FERRARI, “Universal and Regional Sales Law: Can They Coexist?”, 8 Unif. L. 
Rev. / Rev. dr. unif. (2003), 177; G. PARRA-ARANGUREN, “Conflict of Law Aspects of the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts”, 69 Tulane Law Review (1995), 1239; A.M. 
GARRO, “Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods”, 23 International Lawyer (1989), 443, 480-83. 
54  It should, of course, be noted that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods also excludes these, and the Convention also excludes the 
statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule. The Convention is the law of the United States, as 
the United States has ratified it, but in these areas, as with some other areas of the Convention, 
provides rules that are not otherwise in conformity with American law. 
55  PICC Art. 1.4. Presupposing the possibility of a mandatory writing requirement in the 
appropriate enforcing jurisdiction, the Principles define “writing” in PICC Art. 1.10. It has been 
noted that “[a]rticle 1.10, which, in defining ‘writing’ … takes into account the fact that 
messages and other forms of information are increasingly exchanged in a paper-free fashion by 
electronic means.” 
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2. If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, such statements and other 
conduct shall be interpreted according to the meaning that a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the other party would give to it in the same 
circumstances.56  
The Principles also have a general rule of interpretation of party intent 
that is a modified rule of objective interpretation: 
1. A contract shall be interpreted according to the common intention of the 
parties. 
2. If such an intention cannot be established, the contract shall be 
interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the 
same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstances.57  
This rule is similar to the Common law American approach—the meaning 
that reasonable persons would have given the language controls unless both 
parties intended a different meaning.58  
Moreover, similar to the Common law, but without the hierarchical 
ordering, the Principles set out a categorization of the types of evidence that 
might be used to show intent: 
In applying Articles 4.1 and 4.2, regard shall be had to all the 
circumstances, including 
(a)  preliminary negotiations between the parties; 
(b)  practices which the parties have established between 
themselves; 
(c)  the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the 
contract;  
(d)  the nature and purpose of the contract; 
(e)  the meaning commonly given to terms and expressions in the 
trade concerned; 
(f)  usages.59  
 
56  PICC Art. 4.2. 
57  PICC Art. 4.1. 
58  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(1): “Where the parties have attached 
the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance 
with that meaning.” 
59  PICC Art. 4.3. 
The UNIDROIT Principles: an American Perspective on the Principles and Their Use 
Rev. dr. unif. 2012 525 
Without delving into the complexities of the Common law parol evidence 
rule, the Principles do, unlike the Convention, provide guidance on the effect 
of a merger clause: 
A contract in writing which contains a clause indicating that the 
writing completely embodies the terms on which the parties have 
agreed cannot be contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior 
statements or agreements. However, such statements or agreements 
may be used to interpret the writing.60 
This is similar to the Common law parol evidence rule, which provides 
that an integrated agreement can be explained by evidence outside the record, 
because it cannot be contradicted or supplemented by terms outside the 
agreement, as it is more limited in scope since this rule only applies where 
there is a merger clause. It should also be noted that unlike this rule, there is 
no clear position in American law on whether a merger clause is conclusive, 
as it is in the Principles, or merely presumptive. 
The law of warranty for contracts for the sale of goods is another example 
where there is a major divergence between American law and the Principles. 
The Principles and the American Uniform Commercial Code both assume that 
the seller must tender goods that conform to the contract. Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, this is resolved under a theory of warranty.61 The American 
law of warranty is an outgrowth of a long history of Common law responsibility 
that has its roots in both contract and tort.62 Thus, the Code rules are very much 
grounded in this history. In contrast, the Principles do not have a general theory 
of warranty. Instead, under the Principles, the obligation to deliver goods that 
conform to the contract description is derived from the general obligation to 
perform at a reasonable quality 63 and the duty to achieve a specific result.64 
Unlike the American law of warranty, the Principles do not specify any specific 
terms, such as “warranty”, to define these obligations. Although the difference is 
 
60  PICC Art. 2.1.17. 
61  The seller may make an express warranty, an implied warranty of merchantability, or 
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or all three in a particular transaction. 
These warranties are terms of the contract to which the goods must conform. See U.C.C. Rev. 
§2-313 and 2-315.  
62  For the classic and standard article tracing the rise of American warranty law through 
the morass of tort and contract, see W.L. PROSSER, “The Implied Warranty of Merchantable 
Quality”, 27 Minnesota Law Review (1943), 117. 
63  PICC Art. 5.6. 
64  PICC Art. 5.4(1). 
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primarily one of terminology, the difference can be significant. Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, one is often looking to the language of warranty as 
well as the well-established rules based on the warranty language.65 In contrast, 
because the Principles do not work in terms of warranty, there are no familiar 
terms to help grasp the similarities. 
This point is emphasized in the modification and disclaimer provision for 
warranties. Because the term “warranty” is not used, the Principles have no 
provision for the “exclusion or modification” of warranties. The Principles deal 
with disputes over quality by providing a flexible standard that requires that, 
where the quality is neither fixed by nor determinable from the contract, a party 
is bound to render performance of a quality that is reasonable and not less than 
average in the circumstances.66 The Uniform Commercial Code, on the other 
hand, offers quite a bit of protection to the buyer against attempts by the seller 
to exclude or limit express and implied warranties by agreement. Thus, for 
example, if an attempt to negate or limit cannot be construed as reasonably 
consistent with an express warranty, the disclaimer is “inoperative”. 67 
Similarly, a disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability must meet 
certain requirements of form and disclosure.68 Thus, the effort to limit or 
exclude “must mention merchantability” and if the disclaimer is in writing, 
“must be conspicuous”. 69  
Although it has been proclaimed as “the Magna Carta of international 
commercial law”,70 the concept of good faith and fair dealing has no fixed 
meaning in the law. This is another legal concept that could not be said to be the 
same in American commercial law and the Principles. The Principles expressly 
state a standard of good faith for the conduct of the parties: “Each party must act 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade.” 71 This 
obligation 72 exists throughout the whole of the contract, including nego-
 
65  The American courts have had this problem with the CISG, and there has been a 
tendency for the courts to analyze CISG cases in terms of warranty law. See, e.g., Schmitz-
Werke Gmbh & Co. v. Rockland Industries, Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 687 (4th Cir. 2002). 
66  PICC Art. 5.6. 
67  Uniform Commercial Code §2-316(1). 
68  Uniform Commercial Code §2-316(2).  
69  Ibidem. 
70  K.P. BERGER, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law 
International (1999), at 165. 
71  PICC Art. 1.7(1). 
72  This obligation is non-waivable, PICC Art. 1.7(2). 
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tiations.73 This application of the concept is similar to that taken by many 
Civilian systems, but not necessarily that taken by some Common law 
jurisdictions.74 Thus, in no sense can it be assumed to be a universal 
application of the concept of good faith. 
It has been suggested that “good faith” under the Principles is an 
objective, not a subjective standard.75 This is consistent with many Civil law 
jurisdictions,76 but not necessarily the standard in some Common law 
jurisdictions. The concept of “good faith” in the Principles includes both 
“abuse of rights” as well as “inconsistent behavior”. 77 
The meaning of “good faith” in the Uniform Commercial Code, in 
contrast to the Principles, is bifurcated. Most articles of the Code have 
adopted a definition of good faith that applies both an objective and 
subjective standard to all parties.78 Article 5: Letters of Credit does not adopt 
the objective component of the definition. This is a deliberate decision based 
on customary practices with regard to letters of credit.79 
(b) Formation 
The rules of contract formation under the Principles are, for the most part, 
consistent with the American law. The Principles do not define the necessary 
terms of exchange between the parties, and therefore the issue of Common 
law “consideration” or Civil law “cause” is avoided. As for the rules of offer 
and acceptance, the Principles differ from the American Common law on the 
 
73  Comment 1 to PICC Art. 1.7. 
74  See, e.g., R. GOODE, The Concept of “Good Faith” in English Law, Centro di Studi e 
Ricerche di Diretto Comparato e Straniero (1992). 
75  One rationale for this is that because “good faith” is coupled with the term “fair 
dealing”, which is understood to be an objective standard, “good faith” should likewise be 
interpreted as an objective standard: BONELL, International Restatement, supra note 5, at 131. 
However, it is just as reasonable to assume that because both terms are present, “good faith” 
should be interpreted subjectively to complement the objective standard of “fair dealing”. 
76  See, e.g., A.S. HARTKAMP, “Judicial Discretion under the New Civil Code of the 
Netherlands”, 40 American Journal of Comparative Law (1992), 551, 554-555. 
77  BONELL, International Restatement, supra note 5, at 133–134. These are both Civil 
law concepts. Inconsistent behavior most clearly resembles the doctrine of equitable estoppel in 
the Common law.  
78  See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §1-201(20) of revised Art. 1; §3-103(6) of 
revised Art. 3, imported into Art. 4 by §4-104(c); §4A-105(a)(6); §7-102(a)(6) of revised Art. 7; 
§8-102(a)(10) of amended Art. 8; and §9-102(a)(43) of revised Art. 9.  
79  See Uniform Commercial Code §5-102(a)(7). 
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question of when an acceptance becomes effective. Under the Principles, an 
acceptance is effective upon receipt of the acceptance by the offeror;80 under 
the Common law, it is effective upon dispatch.81 
(c) Fundamental non-performance 
The Principles provide that a party may suspend its own performance and 
terminate the contract upon the other party’s “fundamental non-perform-
ance”.82 As with any broad concept, the term “fundamental non-performance” 
is not subject to a precise definition, and there is no attempt in the Principles 
to provide one.83  
The Common law does not have a concept directly equivalent to 
fundamental non-performance. However, developing from the doctrine of 
conditions in contracts, the Common law 84 has developed a similar concept of 
“material breach”. The Restatement defines a material breach as “a condition of 
each party’s remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an 
exchange of promise that there be no uncured material failure by the other party 
to render such performance due at an earlier time.” 85 Therefore, to the extent 
that there is a material breach, as with a fundamental non-performance under 
the Principles, the non-breaching party has not only a right to damages, but also 
the right to quit performance of that party’s own obligations. Moreover, the 
factors for determining a material breach are similar to the factors one would 
consider for a fundamental non-performance.86 
Yet, the cautious lawyer would be circumspect in equating the two 
concepts, for one can never be sure a court or arbitral tribunal will also equate 
“fundamental non-performance” and “material breach”. This fear can be easily 
alleviated by providing clear, express guidance for the grounds for termin-
ation. Doing so would override the standards for termination and insure there 
was no basis for different standards.  
 
80  PICC Art. 2.3(1). 
81  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63. 
82  PICC Art. 7.3.(1). 
83  General guidance on the types of factors to consider is provided in PICC Art. 7.3.(1). 
84  At least the American branch. At least one Canadian court has concurred that the 
Common law standard for fundamental breach is the same as that of the Convention. See 
Diversitel Communications Inc. v. Glacier Bay Inc., 42 C.P.C. (5th) 196 (2003). 
85  Restatement (Second) of Contracts §237. 
86  Restatement (Second) of Contracts §241. 
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(d) Contract modification  
The traditional Common law rule for contract modification requires new 
consideration to modify the agreement. The Principles, conversely, actively 
eschew the necessity of new “consideration” or “cause” and provide simply that 
“[a] contract is concluded, modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the 
parties, without any further requirements.” 87 Thus, the Principles simply do not 
address the question of whether consideration or cause (in other words, 
whether additional value) is necessary for a modification of the agreement. 
Deviating from the traditional Common law rule, this is the approach taken by 
the American Uniform Commercial Code for contracts for the sale of goods.88 
(e) Damages 
Consistent with American Common law, the Principles provide for a general 
right of damages for the aggrieved party.89 Also consistent, in appropriate 
cases, under the Principles this would include personal injury losses.90 In 
addition, consistent with the American Common law, under the Principles the 
damages must be foreseeable, and the Principles adopt both an objective and 
a subjective standard of foreseeability.91 Across the board, the right to and the 
measurement of damages is consistent between the Principles and American 
commercial contract law.  
(f) Assignment of rights 
The Principles, consistent with the American commercial law, assume 
contractual rights are freely assignable.92 This rule, in American law, of course 
is a general rule subject to many statutory exceptions. An agreement otherwise 
governed by the Principles would also be subject to these statutory excep-
tions, as the exceptions would be mandatory rules that would govern over the 
default provisions of the Principles,93 thus effectively creating the same 
standard for both American commercial law and the Principles. Also 
 
87  PICC Art. 3.2. 
88  Uniform Commercial Code §2-209. 
89  PICC Art. 7.4.2. 
90  PICC Art. 7.4.2(2). 
91  PICC Art. 7.4.4. 
92  PICC Chap. 9. 
93  PICC Art. 1.4. 
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consistent with American commercial law, the Principles recognize non-
assignability clauses, thereby allowing the parties the freedom to restrict the 
assignment of contractual rights.94 
Unlike the traditional common law approach to assignment of rights, the 
Principles specifically allow the transfer of future rights. Many older American 
cases did not allow for this on the theoretical basis that one cannot assign a 
right that does not exist. Most courts would allow the assignment of future 
rights today as an “equitable assignment”,95 and therefore would come to a 
result consistent with the Principles. 
(g) Illegality 
A restriction on the enforcement of illegal contracts could serve as a powerful 
tool to encourage positive behavior between contracting parties. After several 
years of discussion on this issue, however, the drafting committee for the 
Principles was unable to come up with a standard that was effectively 
consistent among the various legal systems. Thus, although adding a section 
on illegal contracts, the Principles in fact do not create any substantive rule for 
illegal contracts. Instead, the Principles simply provide that a provision that 
otherwise infringes a mandatory rule under Article 1.4, is unenforceable.96 
Because the contractual provision would be subject to the otherwise appli-
cable mandatory rule under Article 1.4, the articles on illegality add nothing. 
By deferring to mandatory rules in the domestic law, the article on illegality in 
the Principles is by definition fully in accord with American commercial law.  
(h) Conditions 
Under the American law of contracts, a condition requires the existence of a 
contract. The duties of the respective parties may be conditional such that the 
duties do not come into effect 97 or are suspended 98 unless something occurs 
or does not occur. In either case, there is an existing contract that creates the 
condition and the parties’ contingent duties under it. The Principles provide a 
 
94  PICC Art. 9.1.9. 
95  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 312. 
96  PICC Art. 3.3.1. 
97  Condition precedent. The Principles adopt the Civil Law terminology, and refer to 
this as a suspensive condition. PICC Art. 5.3.1. 
98  Condition subsequent. The Principles adopt the Civil Law terminology, and refer to 
this as a resolutive condition. PICC Art. 5.3.1. 
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similar framework, but also provide for the possibility that the existence of the 
contract itself is subject to a condition: 
Conditions governed by the Principles include both those that deter-
mine whether a contract exists and those that determine obligations 
within a contract. Accordingly, application of the Principles may in 
some circumstances impose duties even in the absence of a contract.99 
This concept is foreign to American law, and how it would be enforced in 
an American court is not clear. Certainly, a court could not enforce the 
condition under contract law given the non-existence of the contract. To the 
extent that it would be fair to enforce the condition, one can assume courts 
either finding a contract subject to a condition as indicating the parties’ true 
intent, or finding some extra contractual basis for enforcement such as 
promissory estoppel.  
(i) Limitation periods 
The Principles provide a limitation period of three years from the time the 
obligee knows or should have known of the basis for the action, subject to a 
maximum period of ten years.100 How the limitation period in the Principles 
operates within the framework of American law requires an appreciation of 
the effect of a limitation period in American law. The Principles note that: 
All legal systems recognize the influence of passage of time on rights. There 
are two basic systems. Under one system, the passage of time extinguishes 
rights and actions. Under the other system, the passage of time operates only 
as a defense against an action in court. Under the Principles a lapse of time 
does not extinguish rights, but operates only as a defense.101 
Under American law, a limitation period is created by statute, and 
whether the limitation period is considered jurisdictional, and therefore 
extinguishes the rights, or is in the nature of a defense and therefore has to be 
affirmatively raised or is therefore waived, varies from state to state and statute 
to statute. Given this complexity, it is not possible to determine with any 
sense of accuracy how the limitation period in the Principles would work with 
American law. However, some general observations can be made. 
 
99  PICC Art. 5.3.1, Comment 1. 
100  PICC Art. 10.2. 
101  PICC Art. 101, Comment 1. 
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First, to the extent that the domestic limitation period is jurisdictional, it is 
likely to be treated as a mandatory rule under Article 1.4, and therefore if the 
domestic limitation period is less than the one provided by the Principles, the 
shorter domestic period will govern as the court would not have jurisdiction 
to hear the case after this time. If the limitation period under the Principles is 
shorter, that shorter period should also govern as a matter of party choice. In 
other words, while a court would have jurisdiction to hear the claim, the 
parties would have contractually limited it, and this limitation should be 
binding.  
If the domestic limitation period is not jurisdictional, but simply a defense 
to enforcement, and if the limitation period in the Principles is the shorter 
period, then the parties should be held to have agreed by party choice to the 
shorter period. If the domestic limitation period is the shorter period, then it 
would apply if the party in whose favor the period would run raises it as a 
defense.  
VII. –  CONCLUSION 
Although originally promulgated in 1994, the UNIDROIT Principles have had 
virtually no influence on American law. This might be due to a lack of fami-
liarity with the Principles among American contracting parties and American 
lawyers.  
It may also be due to a lack of recognition as to the usefulness of Principles 
as a choice of law. As explained above, the primary question most trans-
actional lawyers ask is which law applies so that they know what to contract 
around. Given that, there is a natural resistance to adopt a new and unfamiliar 
set of legal rules irrespective of how balanced and well written they may be.  
American lawyers have slowly become familiar with the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, but this is due 
primarily because the Convention is binding law, and therefore it governs 
many agreements. Even here, for many years, parties routinely opted out of 
the Convention primarily for fear of having to master a new and unknown body 
of law. Whether parties will embrace the Principles, another new and unknown 
body of law, without the impetus of it being binding, is yet to be seen. 
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